The "Mystery of the Insurgency", Solved
American forces in Iraq have often been accused of being slow to apply hard lessons from Vietnam and elsewhere about how to fight an insurgency. Yet, it seems from the outside, no one has shrugged off the lessons of history more decisively than the insurgents themselves.
The insurgents in Iraq are showing little interest in winning hearts and minds among the majority of Iraqis, in building international legitimacy, or in articulating a governing program or even a unified ideology or cause beyond expelling the Americans. They have put forward no single charismatic leader, developed no alternative government or political wing, displayed no intention of amassing territory to govern now.
Rather than employing the classic rebel tactic of provoking the foreign forces to use clumsy and excessive force and kill civilians, they are cutting out the middleman and killing civilians indiscriminately themselves, in addition to more predictable targets like officials of the new government. Bombings have escalated in the last two weeks, and on Thursday a bomb went off in heavy traffic in Baghdad, killing 21 people.
This surge in the killing of civilians reflects how mysterious the long-term strategy remains - and how the rebels' seeming indifference to the past patterns of insurgency is not necessarily good news for anyone.
It is not surprising that reporters, and evidently American intelligence agents, have had great difficulty penetrating this insurgency. What is surprising is that the fighters have made so little effort to advertise unified goals.
Counter-insurgency experts are baffled, wondering if the world is seeing the birth of a new kind of insurgency; if, as in China in the 1930's or Vietnam in the 1940's, it is taking insurgents a few years to organize themselves; or if, as some suspect, there is a simpler explanation.
"Instead of saying, 'What's the logic here, we don't see it,' you could speculate, there is no logic here," said Anthony James Joes, a professor of political science at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia and the author of several books on the history of guerrilla warfare. The attacks now look like "wanton violence," he continued. "And there's a name for these guys: Losers."
"The insurgents are doing everything wrong now," he said. "Or, anyway, I don't understand why they're doing what they're doing."
Steven Metz, of the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, said the insurgency could still be sorting itself out. Yet, he said, "It really is significant that even two years in there hasn't been anything like any kind of political ideology or political spokesman or political wing emerging. It really is a nihilistic insurgency."
He warned that this hydra-headed quality could make the insurgents hard to crush, even as the lack of unity makes it unlikely they will rule Iraq. "It makes it harder to eradicate the insurgency, but it also makes it more difficult for insurgents to gain their ultimate objective - if that is to control the country," he said.
That no one knows if that is the objective is, by historical standards, one of several remarkable, perplexing features of this fight.
A clear cause - one with broad support - is usually taken for granted by experts as a prerequisite for successful insurgency.
But insurgents in Iraq appear to be fighting for varying causes: Baath Party members are fighting for some sort of restoration of the old regime; Sunni Muslims are presumably fighting to prevent domination by the Shiite majority; nationalists are fighting to drive out the Americans; and foreign fighters want to turn Iraq into a battlefield of a global religious struggle. Some men are said to fight for money; organized crime may play a role.
This incoherence is something new. "If you look at 20th-century insurgencies, they all tend to be fairly coherent in terms of their ideology," Dr. Metz said. "Most of the serious insurgencies, you could sit down and say, 'Here's what they want.' "
The Iraq War is not the Vietnam War. In fact, no other war was the Vietnam War. Each war is different, with different combatants, aims, and strategies.
Just on the off chance that The Times cares about covering the Iraq War, and not merely about taking cheap shots at a Republican administration, here is what is going on in Iraq, written in simple words so even Columbia Journalism School alumni might have a chance to comprehend it:
1. While the UN was busy lining their pockets with Oil-for-Food money and cluck-clucking about the slowest rush to war since WWII, Saddam Hussein laid plans for an insurgency during the eventual American occupation of Iraq. This involved some degree of coordination with terrorist groups chiefly supported by Syria and Iran.
2. On the eve of the war, Hussein let a large number of violent criminals out of Iraqi prisons. The intent was to create mayhem.
3. During the war, a large number of Iraqi military units simply dissolved. Some of their leaders and combatants went underground, eventually surfacing in Sunni strongholds.
4. The reason why there are no coordinated efforts in the "insurgency" is that to a very real extent there is no insurgency. There are pockets of foreign terrorists and plenty of violent criminals plying their deadly trade. al Zarqawi couldn't care less about "hearts and minds" of Iraqis---he wants to kill Americans and force an eventual American withdrawal. He's not a guerilla leader, he's a terrorist. He has no real movement. Likewise, the violent criminals committing random murders and bombings don't care about winning over anybody---they simply don't want to go back to jail, and are taking out some sick measure of revenge upon the Iraqi people. The Syrian and Iranian agents couldn't care less what happens to the Iraqis---they're pursuing their own interests, which chiefly are getting American troops off their doorsteps.
5. The "insurgency" has been a media creation. Like the "wolf packs" of former Nazis who were mopped up in the years after V-E Day, there's not a lot of evidence that the attacks in Iraq represent a coordinated rebellion or foreign intervention. Pieces of it no doubt are, but this does not make for "The Insurgency".
6. Journalists who fault our military for not "learning the lessons of Vietnam" are simply too stupid to worry about. U.S. military doctrine is firmly based on lessons learned in Vietnam, and much of the discussion in war colleges over the past 30 years have been over how to avoid such a disaster in the future. Do you wonder why American military commanders placed so much emphasis on getting electric grids, sewage treatment plants, and trash collection up and running in the middle of an "insurgency"? It's because they understand the importance of winning over the Iraqi civilians. The U.S. press doesn't cover these important counterinsurgency tactics because a) they make the Bush Administration and Don Rumsfeld look good and b) they're boring stories. The fact that this indicates the war for the hearts and minds of Iraqis is won by the good guys already and that more and more "insurgents" are being turned in by these same civilians simply escapes the MSM. Thus the "mystery."
Instead of talking to "counterinsurgency experts" nobody's ever heard of, why don't you call up an American Lieutenant Colonel over in Iraq and ask what he thinks? This would of course require actually having U.S. military officers in your Rolodex, which might be a stretch for our reporters.
If that's too hard, try calling up a military historian like John Keegan or Victor Davis Hanson. They'll tell you what's going on.
Of course, that gets back to my original dangerous assumption: that the MSM actually cares what's going on in Iraq.
Update:
If Powerline be with us, who can be against us?

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